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ABSTRACT
People are stupid when it comes to their online postings. The recent spate of
social-networking websites has shown that people place shocking amounts of
personal information online. Unlike more traditional modes of communication, the
unique nature of these websites allows users to hide behind a veil of anonymity.
But while social-networking sites may carry significant social benefits, they also
leave users—and their personal information—vulnerable to hacking and other
forms of abuse. This vulnerability is playing out in courtrooms across the country
and will only increase as social-networking use continues to proliferate.
This Article addresses the evidentiary hurdle of authenticating socialnetworking evidence, a novel legal issue confronting courts today. The Article
explains and critiques four approaches used by different jurisdictions, concluding
that each approach fails to adequately address the critical issue of authorship. The
anonymous nature of social-networking websites, coupled with the extent of users’
personal information available online, raises serious concerns about the authorship
of any piece of evidence posted to one of these sites. Litigants are using socialnetworking postings in court, attributing authorship to a particular person without
demonstrating a sufficient nexus between the posting and the purported author.
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Absent this nexus, however, the evidence fails to meet even the low hurdle of
authentication. To remedy this problem, this Article proposes that courts shift their
focus from account ownership and content to authorship of the evidence. Working
within the existing rules of evidence, this approach underscores the importance of
fairness and accuracy in the outcome of judicial proceedings that involve socialnetworking evidence.
INTRODUCTION
People are stupid when it comes to their online postings. 1 Using socialnetworking sites, people document their every move no matter how foolish or
incriminating. This propensity applies not only to ordinary citizens,2 but also to
lawyers,3 judges,4 and even members of Congress.5 New York Congressman Chris
1

I certainly do not mean to imply that people are not also stupid in other settings and contexts. I leave that
discussion for others, however, as this is only a law review article and not a multi-volume treatise.
2
News stories and law review articles abound with examples of idiotic behavior exhibited online. See, e.g., Evan E.
North, Facebook Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking Websites, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1279,
1279 (2010) (providing one example of an insurance company that persuaded an attorney to settle an accident claim
after finding on Facebook and MySpace photographs and video of the attorney’s client “snowboarding . . . [and]
‘going off jumps on his snowboard at a high rate of speed’”). Edward Marshall, Burglar Leaves his Facebook Page
on Victim’s Computer, THE JOURNAL (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.journal‐news.net/page/content.detail/id/
525232.html (describing the ill-fated Facebook status-check that led to the burglar’s arrest after he stole two
diamond rings in the same room as the computer—but not the computer); Jason Deans, Facebook Juror Jailed for
Eight Months, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 16, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/16/facebookjuror-jailed-for-eight-months (explaining that juror Joanne Fraill was held in contempt of court and sentenced to
eight months in jail for Facebook-messaging the defendant about the case and the pending charges while the jury
was deliberating); Leah Hope, Authorities Make String of Underage Drinking Arrests from Facebook Photos,
ABC7NEWS.COM, Jan. 14, 2008, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/ story?section=news/local&id=5890815 (reporting on
charges filed against teenagers in a Chicago suburb for possession of alcohol by a minor that resulted from
authorities’ discovery of photographs posted on Facebook depicting the underage drinking at a house party); Mary
Lynn Smith & Courtney Blanchard, Facebook Photos Land Eden Prairie Kids in Trouble, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Jan. 9, 2008, at B1. Mary Lynn Smith & Courtney Blanchard, Facebook Photos Land Eden Prairie
Kids in Trouble, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/local/west/13549646.html
(detailing the punishment of more than 100 students in a Minneapolis suburb after school administrators obtained
photographs from Facebook of the students holding and consuming alcoholic beverages).
3
After proudly posting on his Facebook page that he obtained a mistrial for his client, a New Jersey defense attorney
was later mocked by the press because the mistrial occurred “due to the defense lawyer’s [poor] trial performance.”
Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Who Never Tried a Case Proud of Murder Mistrial on Facebook, Humiliated in
Interview, ABAJOURNAL.COM (Apr. 5, 2011, 7:41 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_who_
never_tried_a_ case_proud_of_murder_mistrial_on_facebook_humiliat/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email
&utm_campaign=weekly_email. A prosecutor from Minnesota allegedly posted “keeping the streets safe from
Somalians” to her Facebook account while prosecuting a Somali man for murder. Abby Simons, Facebook Motion
Thrown out Again, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 13, 2010, at B4. In Texas, a lawyer found herself caught in a lie
when, after asking the judge for a continuance to attend a relative’s funeral, the judge viewed the lawyer’s Facebook
profile, which showed that the lawyer was in fact on vacation. Molly McDonough, Facebooking Judge Catches
Lawyer in Lie, Sees Ethical Breaches, ABAJOURNAL.COM (July 31, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/facebooking_judge_catches_lawyers_in_lies_crossing_ethical_lines_abachicago/.
4
A North Carolina judge received a public reprimand when he not only agreed to “friend” a lawyer who was
appearing before him, but also proceeded to communicate with the lawyer via Facebook about the case as the trial
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Lee’s recent faux pas presents a prime example of such idiocy. Representative Lee
sent flirtatious messages and shirtless photographs of himself to a woman via
Craigslist while using his own name and an “e-mail address traceable to his
Facebook page.”6 This momentary lapse in judgment forced the Congressman to
resign from office in February 2011.7
More recently, New York Congressman Anthony Weiner followed suit by
partaking in several inappropriate relationships using a variety of socialnetworking sites; most notably, Congressman Weiner sent a lewd photograph of
himself to a college student via Twitter.8 Even though the photograph message was
traceable to his Twitter account, Representative Weiner adamantly denied having
sent it, claiming that his account was hacked.9 About a week later, Representative
Weiner confessed that he had in fact sent the photograph10 and, shortly thereafter,
resigned due to political pressure.11
Gaffes like Representatives Lee’s or Weiner’s are sure to become increasingly
common as more people put their personal lives online. This is especially true with
social-networking websites like Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter. In recent years,
these sites have become an ingrained part of our culture. Their popularity can be
seen in a variety of ways: individuals use them to connect with friends; media
outlets use them to get viewers’ perspectives on the latest news;12 companies and
educational institutions use them to keep closer contact with their customers and
students; 13 and non-profit organizations use them to garner support for their

progressed. Robert J. Ambrogi, Facebook Friend Earns Judge a Reprimand, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (June 1, 2009,
2:09
PM),
http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2009/06/facebook‐friend‐earns‐judge‐a‐
reprimand. html.
5
See Roxanne Roberts & Amy Argetsinger, The Chris Lee Scandal and the anonymity of the average congressman,
THE RELIABLE SOURCE (Feb. 14, 2011, 12:00AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/reliable‐source/2011/02/
the_chris_lee_scandal_and_the_anonymity_of_the_average_congressman.html; see also David A. Fahrenthold &
Aaron Blake, Congressman Resigns After Report of Online Flirting, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2011, at A1.; Chris
Cuomo, Chris Vlasto & Devin Dwyer, Rep. Anthony Weiner: ‘The Picture Was of Me and I Sent It,’
ABC7NEWS.COM, June 6, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rep-anthony-weiner-picture/story?id=13774605.
6
Roberts & Argetsinger, supra note 5.
7
Fahrenthold & Blake, supra note 5.
8
Cuomo et al., supra note 5.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
David A. Fahrenthold & Paul Kane, As Controversy Builds, Weiner Resigns, WASH. POST, June 17, 2011, at A1.
12
See, e.g., CNN, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/cnn (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (“The CNN fan page
provides instant breaking news alerts and the day’s newsiest and most talked about stories.”).
13
See, e.g., LLM Program in Law & Government - Washington College of Law - AU, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/LawGovAUWCL (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (“A page for Students, Alumni, Faculty
and Friends of the LL.M. Program in Law & Government at American University Washington College of Law.”).
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causes. 14 But as the sites’ popularity increases, so does their susceptibility for
abuse.
Social-networking sites have become conduits for crimes and other wrongful
behavior—such as harassment and bullying—because they are both easy to use and
can be anonymous.15 Consequently, these sites are beginning to play a critical role
in litigation. Social-networking postings 16 have been entered as evidence in all
forms of litigation, often against the alleged authors of the postings. This Article
focuses on the authentication of this type of evidence at trial.
The authentication requirement is a preliminary evidentiary threshold,
mandating that proponents of evidence provide proof “sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” 17 Moreover, the
requirement advances one of the major goals of the rules of evidence: to ensure
that, in the end, the “truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.” 18
Considering the vulnerability of social-networking sites to
exploitation, authentication is a critical component to guarantee, to the greatest
extent possible, that juries are presented with reliable evidence, and that the
proceedings are fair and just.19
Part I of this Article presents background information on typical uses of
social-networking sites as well as examples of how people misuse these sites by
creating fake accounts or hacking into other accounts to obtain or alter the owner’s
personal information. Part II outlines the various roles that social-networking sites
play in litigation. Law-enforcement officials, as well as lawyers, increasingly are
turning to social-networking sites to search for evidence or to gather information to
impeach a witness’s credibility. Part III discusses authentication requirements in
general.
Part IV provides an in-depth explanation of the current judicial
approaches used to authenticate social-networking evidence. Part IV then critiques
these approaches, specifically addressing courts’ failures to require a demonstrated
14

See, e.g., American Red Cross, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/redcross (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (“The
American Red Cross is a humanitarian organization led by volunteers. We provide relief to victims of disaster and
help people prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.”).
15
See, e.g., infra note 32.
16
For the purposes of this paper, I refer to both postings and messages as “postings.” See discussion infra Part I.A
for a differentiation between private postings that are sent between users, known as messages, and public postings
that are displayed on a user’s public profile page.
17
FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
18
FED. R. EVID. 102.
19
The court in St. Clair v. Johnny Oyster & Shrimp, 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999) was incredibly suspicious
of all web-based evidence, stating that the Internet is “one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation”
and that “hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at any time.” Id. at 774–75 (emphasis
in original). But see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(declining to follow the “extreme view” taken by St. Clair). Despite the polar, and perhaps outdated, position
espoused by the St. Clair court, it raised the issues that future courts deciding the authenticity of social-networking
postings must consider: From where did the information come, who authored it, and did anyone alter it?
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nexus between the postings being offered into evidence and the purported author of
the postings. Finally, Part V advocates a new, authorship-centric approach to
authentication. Working within Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), this Part
recommends a set of factors that courts should consider when ruling on the
authenticity of social-networking evidence. The Article concludes that authorship is
critical to authentication. Courts should thus act as gatekeepers, considering these
issues at the admissibility stage before admitting the evidence and allowing the
finder of fact to weigh its reliability.
I.

USES OF SOCIAL-NETWORKING SITES

Social-networking sites are websites that “link networks of individuals into
online communities through personalized web ‘profiles.’”20 These sites established
an Internet presence in the early 2000s and have seen a recent and drastic increase
in popularity.21 This Part discusses the general uses of social-networking sites, as
well as common misuses—such as creating fake accounts and hacking.
A. General Uses
Social-networking sites facilitate interpersonal relationships and information
exchanges by allowing individual users to search for others who are part of their
social network and add them as “friends.”22 Each social-networking user creates a
profile page. Facebook explicitly requires members to use their real names when
20

Daniel Findlay, Comment, Tag! Now You’re Really “It” What Photographs on Social Networking Sites Mean for
the Fourth Amendment, 10 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 171, 180 (2008). In 2007, the two dominant social-networking sites
were Facebook, founded in 2004 by an undergraduate at Harvard University, and MySpace, founded in 2003 by two
Silicon Valley friends. John S. Wilson, Comment, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in
Electronic Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1221–22 (2007); see also Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social
Network Sites:
Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (2007),
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html. Twitter has now taken over the number two spot, followed
by MySpace and LinkedIn. Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking, EBIZMBA.COM, http://www.ebizmba.
com/articles/social-networking-websites (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
21
See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS
AND YOUNG ADULTS 2 (2010), available at http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-YoungAdults.aspx (summarizing the increased use of social-networking among teens and both young and older adults). In
particular, the use of social-networking sites has increased exponentially in the last few years. In 2009, Facebook
membership exceeded 300 million users, and 73% of online teens use social-networking sites, up from 55% in
November 2006 and 65% in February 2008. Id. at 2; Shannon Aswumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next EDiscovery Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 23, 23 (2009), available at http://www.mnbar.org/bench
andbar/2009/nov09/networking.html. In 2011, Facebook membership exceeded 750 million users. Factsheet,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited Sept. 16, 2011). The social-networking
phenomenon is not limited to younger Internet users. Forty-seven percent of online adults use social-networking
sites, representing a ten-percentage-point increase since November 2008. LENHART, supra note 21, at 3.
22
See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 20, at 213.

5

creating profiles, but many other social-networking sites, such as MySpace, actually
encourage the creation of pseudonymous accounts by permitting users to create
profiles using nicknames, symbols, and incorrect capitalization. 23 These profiles
display personal, identifying information such as birth dates, hometowns, alma
maters, and relationship statuses. They are the medium through which users
exchange anecdotes about their interests and activities. 24 Users also share
photographs and videos, in which they may “tag,” or identify, other users.25 On
most social-networking sites, users can send private messages to others as well as
make comments on their own or other users’ profile pages. These latter comments
are not necessarily private; the number of people who can see them depends on both
the specific social-networking site and the users’ individual settings. Users govern
their social-networking experiences by providing as much or as little information on
their profile pages as they wish, and by controlling their privacy settings to restrict
who can view and post information to these pages.26
While social-networking sites allow individuals to reconnect with old friends
or find new ones with ease, they also are being used to harass, intimidate, and
emotionally abuse or bully others. Malefactors can utilize pseudonyms to create
fake accounts without the alleged account holder’s knowledge or consent; they can
also hack into legitimate accounts to access the vast quantities of personal
information that the accounts contain.
B. Fake Accounts

23

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 17,
2011); Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE.COM, http://www.myspace.com/help/terms (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
24
See Wilson, supra note 20, at 1220.
25
Facebook defines “tagging” as follows: “A tag links a person, page, or place to something you post, like a status
update or a photo.” Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=18947 (last visited Sept. 30,
2011).
26
See generally Matthew J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet:
Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 107–09 (2006) (indicating that the default privacy setting on
MySpace allows all users to see a profile, and that the default setting on Facebook allows all users within a
“network” to view a profile). A user’s privacy settings are not all-encompassing and can be prone to ambiguity,
error, or outright fraud. See, e.g., Dan Goodin, Facebook Caught Exposing Millions of User Credentials, THE
REGISTER (U.K.) (May 10, 2011, 7:23 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/05/10/facebook_user_
credentials_leaked/ (stating that “Facebook has leaked access to millions of users’ photographs, profiles and other
personal information because of a years-old bug that overrides individual privacy settings,” and that “Facebook over
the years has regularly been criticized for compromising the security of its users”); Jason Kincaid, New Facebook
iPhone App Brings New Privacy Bugs With It, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 8, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/
2009/09/08/new-facebook-iphone-app-brings-new-privacy-bugs-with-it/ (describing iPhone Facebook application
bug circumventing user privacy settings).
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“Fake” accounts are social-networking accounts that are either created in one
person’s name by someone else or by a person using a pseudonym.27 These accounts
are often used as conduits for teasing and bullying.28 The “Terms of Service,” or
user agreements, of many social-networking sites prohibit users from creating
profiles that impersonate others, as well as from using the site to harass others or
commit crimes.29 Yet there is effectively no check on fake accounts or false profiles,
unless someone lodges a complaint with the social-networking company.30
Regardless of these restrictions, social-networking users are increasingly
making use of these sites for harassing behavior.31 In addition, the anonymity of
social-networking sites permits stalkers and bullies—using fake accounts—to take
their harmful conduct above and beyond traditional harrying.32 The infamous Lori
Drew and Latisha Monique Frazier cases provide excellent examples. Drew, the
mother of a thirteen-year-old girl, created a MySpace page with the picture of a

27

See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text.
29
See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30
E.g., Ki Mae Huessner, Teens Sued for Fake Facebook Profile, ABCNEWS.COM (Sept. 29, 2009),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/AheadoftheCurve/teens-sued-fake-facebook-profile/story?id=8702282
(reporting the comments of a Facebook representative, stating that “the time it takes for the team to respond depends
on the complaint[;] . . . reports of nudity, pornography and harassing personal messages are the highest priority
complaints”).
31
At least two federal cases have addressed this problem. Students created false MySpace accounts with cut-andpasted pictures from school-district websites and posted crude and embarrassing misinformation to mock their
schools’ principals. In one of the cases, a high-school student created an account in his principal’s name, claimed
that the principal smoked marijuana and drank alcohol at work, and referred to the principal as a “big whore,” “big
fag,” and “big steroid freak.” Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D.
Pa. 2007). Another case involved two eighth-grade students who created a fake account that portrayed their
principal as a pedophile and a sex addict. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290-92 (3d
Cir. 2010) (noting that one of the students helped to create the false page because she was “mad” at the principal for
disciplining her for a dress code violation), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). In Snyder,
the account contained the principal’s picture with the profile name “kidsrockmybed” and listed as among the
principal’s interests “fucking in my office [and] hitting on students and their parents.” Id. at 291.
32
See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, As Bullies Go Digital, Parents Play Catch-up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2010, at A1
(recounting numerous stories of middle- and high-school students bullying one another via pseudonymous accounts
on social-networking sites, and advising parents about ways to address such bullying). In one tragic case in the
United Kingdom, an adult man who was a known sex offender created a fake Facebook profile using the picture of a
good-looking teenage boy and pretended to be sixteen years old. Ashleigh Hall Was ‘Spitting Image’ of Alleged
Killer’s Former Fiancée, THE TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/crime/6458211/Ashleigh-Hall-was-spitting-image-of-alleged-killers-former-fiancee.html
[hereinafter
Ashleigh Hall] (reporting the killer’s use of Facebook in his crimes); James Slack & Paul Sims, My Guilt at Letting
that Evil Man Walk Free: Prostitute Held Hostage for 15 Hours by Facebook Killer Speaks of Regret, MAIL
ONLINE (U.K.) (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1256307/Facebook-warning-PeterChapman-admits-Ashleigh-Hall-murder.html (providing the picture used by the killer, and reporting that the murder
led to a slew of complaints regarding Facebook’s security measures). The man used the fake Facebook profile to
lure in a teenage girl, whom he later raped and murdered. See Ashleigh Hall, supra. Other less egregious examples
of misconduct on Facebook have also been reported, including one instance in which a teen’s peers created a
Facebook profile in his name and with his picture and depicted the teen as homosexual and racist; they used the false
profile to “friend” nearly 600 people. Huessner, supra note 30.
28
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fictitious sixteen-year-old boy named “Josh Evans.”33 Drew used this fake profile to
torment her daughter’s thirteen-year-old “nemesis,” Megan Meier, who “had a
history of depression and suicidal impulses.” 34 Using the Evans profile, Drew
flirted with Meier for a period of time, then abruptly told Meier that Evans “no
longer liked her” and that “the world would be a better place without her in it.”35
Shortly thereafter, Meier killed herself.36 Drew then deleted the fake account.37
Similarly tragic is the recent story of Latisha Monique Frazier. In August
2010, Frazier went missing shortly after leaving work for the day. 38 As if her
disappearance was not difficult enough for her family, someone created a fake
Facebook profile for Frazier and used it to threaten and harass her family.39 The
first message sent from this profile stated: “Your sister is dead and gone. I’m
watching you! One more dead to go!”40 After Frazier’s family distributed fliers in
the neighborhood to warn others about her disappearance, they received another
message: “Her black ass has been gone . . . . Body parts in Rock Creek. Keep the
fliers out of the . . . hood. We took them down.”41 Fortunately for Frazier’s family, a
local television station aired a story about this harassment, which ultimately led to
the arrest of six people allegedly involved in her disappearance and murder.42
C. Hacking and Identity Theft
Beyond those who create fake accounts to threaten and harass others, people
may break into existing social-networking accounts to acquire or modify information
that the accounts contain. These hackers use a number of techniques to steal users’
login data, including conning users into divulging their passwords and employing
“malware that logs keystrokes.”43 Once hackers achieve access to a user’s account,
33

United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A25; see
also Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
35
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Sam Ford & Richard Reeve, D.C. Family Threatened on Facebook, TBD.COM (Jan. 23, 2011, 8:29 PM),
http://www.tbd.com/articles/2011/01/d-c-family-receives-facebook-threats-46527.html.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.; Keith L. Alexander, Suspect Arraigned in Slaying of District Woman, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/24/AR2011012405883.html; see also Keith L.
Alexander, No Landfill Search for Body of Slain Teen, D.C. Police Say, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/03/AR2011030304912.html.
43
Riva Richmond, Stolen Facebook Accounts for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at B3. Recently, Jesse William
McGraw, the “former leader of an anarchistic hacking group called the Electronik Tribulation Army,” was sentenced
to more than nine years in prison after installing malware on computers at a Texas hospital where he worked as a
34
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they have free reign over all personal information contained therein. They can use
the account to distribute computer viruses and spam as well as to post and send
messages that appear to come from the user. 44
Notably, pervasive posting of personal information on social-networking sites
has facilitated identity theft because hackers can obtain this information and use it
for their own gain. 45 Users who post seemingly innocuous information to their
social-networking profiles, such as full name and birth date, are particularly
susceptible to identity theft. 46 A person’s name and birth date, combined with
certain personal details that are readily available from a social-networking profile,
can supply enough information for an identity thief to apply for credit in that
person’s name or to hack into his or her existing credit accounts.47
In addition to misusing information from individual users’ accounts, identity
thieves are also targeting users’ “friends” in a variation of the well-known “Nigerian
scam.”48 Playing on the increased levels of trust users place in social-networking
security guard. Kevin Poulsen, Leader of Hacker Gang Sentenced to 9 Years For Hospital Malware, WIRED.COM
(Mar. 18, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/tag/anonymous/.
44
See Richmond, supra note 43; Brian Krebs, Hacker’s Latest Target: Social Networking Sites, WASH. POST, Aug.
9, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/08/AR2008080803671.html.
45
Cf.
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
IDENTITY
THEFT
AND
IDENTITY
FRAUD,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/websites/idtheft.html (defining identity theft as a crime “in which someone
wrongfully obtains and uses another person’s personal data in some way that involves fraud or deception, typically
for economic gain”).
46
See Kevin D. Bousquet, Facebook.com vs. Your Privacy – By a Private Investigator, THE PRIVATE
INVESTIGATION CENTRE (Apr. 25, 2007, 3:27 AM), http://corpainvestigation.wordpress.com/2007/04/25/
facebookcom-vs-your-privacy-by-a-private-investigator/ (asserting that a person’s identity can be stolen merely
from the name and birth date and warning about the ease with which hackers can sign onto Facebook and “harvest”
the personal information of hundreds of people).
47
See Steve Lohr, How Privacy Vanishes Online, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at A1 (describing the process of “data
mining,” in which pieces of personal information available on the Internet can be used to predict and describe a
picture of a person’s identity with reasonable accuracy); see also Bousquet, supra note 46 (advising readers that
many of the answers to typical verification questions asked by credit card companies and banks can be found on
social-networking profiles, including mother’s maiden name, dog’s name, and high school). This threat is likely to
worsen as methods of compiling personal data from various websites that people visit increase in sophistication
because such data can reveal social patterns, which in turn, can be used to assist in identity theft. See Lohr, supra.
For instance, researchers studying the correlations between Flickr and Twitter accounts were able to identify more
than thirty percent of users of both online services despite the fact that users’ e-mail addresses and names had been
removed from the accounts. Id. It is not only hackers and identity thieves who possess this ability to post
information that appears to come from the user. Indeed, some social-networking sites, such as Twitter, permit
developers to create protocols “that [allow] users to approve application[s] to act on their behalf without sharing
their password.” OAuth FAQ, TWITTER, http://dev.twitter.com/pages/oauth_faq (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
Therefore, a user could grant an application access to his Twitter account, and the application can then post “tweets”
directly to that account without the user’s knowledge.
48
See Facebook ID Theft Targets “Friends,” RED TAPE CHRON. (Jan. 30, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://redtape.
msnbc.com/2009/01/post-1.html [hereinafter Facebook ID Theft]. Traditionally, the “Nigerian scam” involves a
wrongdoer sending out e-mails with the hope of beguiling people into sending money. FIGHT IDENTITY THEFT,
Nigerian 419 Email Scam (May 29, 2008), http://www.fightidentitytheft.com/internet_scam_nigerian.html. Here, the
sender claims to have a large sum of money that he wants to transfer out of Nigeria, but needs money up-front to
cover the transfer fees. The sender offers a third of the money as a reward for the receiver’s generosity. Id.
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sites, these thieves have started to impersonate social-networking site users and
contact their network friends with plausible stories of being in trouble. 49 For
instance, someone hacked into the Facebook account of a Microsoft employee, Bryan
Rutberg, and posted his status to read: “BRYAN IS IN URGENT NEED OF
HELP!!!”50 The hacker then sent messages to Rutberg’s friends and claimed that
Rutberg “had been robbed at gunpoint while traveling in the United Kingdom and
needed money to get home.”51 The messages provided money-transfer information
for a Western Union in London.52 In addition, the hacker changed Rutberg’s login
information so that Rutberg could not access his own account.53 The hacker also
“unfriended”54 Rutberg’s wife so that Rutberg could not use her account to notify his
friends that he was not in any actual trouble and that a hacker had accessed his
account.55
Between the growth in popularity of social-networking sites and the rising
number of fake accounts and incidents of hacking, there is a clear need for vigilance
to protect vulnerable personal information from exploitation. More importantly,
however, this growth also signals that information from social-networking sites will
begin to play a central role in both civil and criminal litigation.
II.

SOCIAL-NETWORKING POSTINGS IN LITIGATION

The information posted on social-networking sites carries serious legal
dangers, whether the poster is a general user, a creator of a fake account, a hacker,
or an identify thief. As the use of social-networking increases in scope, the
49

See Richmond, supra note 43 (commenting that because social-networking sites are often used to connect with
people that users know, users are “more likely to believe a fraudulent message or click on a dubious link on a
friend’s wall.”); Facebook ID Theft, supra note 48 (reasoning that the imploring message of a friend in trouble
appearing next to the picture of that friend that appears on his or her social-networking account makes the story
more convincing).
50
Facebook ID Theft, supra note 48.
51
Id. (indicating that Rutberg was inundated with phone calls from concerned friends shortly after the hacker
changed Rutberg’s status and sent messages).
52
See id. (reporting that one generous friend was swindled out of $1200 when he sent money to the Western Union
office indicated in the hacked message).
53
Id.
54
Social-networking users can “unfriend” others with whom they are friends. FACEBOOK HELP CTR., Removing
Friends, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=770 (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). This action removes both users
from each other’s friends list. Id.
55
Facebook ID Theft, supra note 48. To make matters worse, it took Rutberg almost a full day to alert Facebook to
the problem, as users cannot contact Facebook via phone, and Facebook did not respond to Rutberg’s attempts to
contact the company through its form complaint procedures. Id. Rutberg is not alone in falling victim to hackers.
Other scammers have hacked into Facebook profiles and “chatted” to online friends of the hacked account, telling
similar stories of being in trouble and in need of cash. See, e.g., Peter Mychalcewycz, Nigerian 419 Scammer
Busted on Facebook Chat, SWITCHED (Jan. 26, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://www.switched.com/2009/01/26/nigerian-419scammer-busted-on-facebook-chat (revealing the transcript of one potential victim’s chat over Facebook with a
would-be Nigerian scammer who posed as a high-school friend of the potential victim).
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information placed in the public sphere is playing an essential role in investigations
and litigation. This information can establish direct links between individuals and
criminal activity, providing a gold mine of personal details, messages, and
photographs that litigators can use as evidence.56 Often unbeknownst to the socialnetworking user, postings leave a permanent trail that law-enforcement agents and
lawyers frequently rely upon in crime solving57 and trial strategy.58
Attorneys and law enforcement agents often use social-networking postings
and photographs to prove a suspect’s direct involvement in a crime.59 In some cases,
people confess to crimes via postings made on their social-networking pages. For
example, officers arrested eighteen-year-old Zakaria Wayso after he posted a status
on his Facebook page confessing that he had shot his friend.60 Wayso was arrested
despite clarifying in the posting that the shooting was an accident and apologizing
to the victim.61 In other cases, people have accessed social-networking sites while in
the process of committing a crime, easing the burden on law-enforcement officers.62
While burglarizing a home, for instance, Jonathan G. Parker checked his Facebook
account and forgot to log out; this led the police to him after the victim returned
56

See Ronald J. Levine & Susan L. Swatski-Lebson, Are Social Networking Sites Discoverable?, LAW.COM (Nov.
13, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202425974937 (“Although these sites provide users with a sense
of intimacy and community, they also create a potentially permanent record of personal information that becomes a
virtual information bonanza about a litigant’s private life and state of mind.”).
57
Daniel Sieberg, Social Networking Sites Help Combat Crime, CBSNEWS.COM, Mar. 13, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/13/eveningnews/main4864837.shtml (reporting that both MySpace and
Facebook assist in criminal investigations by “maintaining a 24-hour law enforcement hotline, issuing manuals and
request forms for police departments, and even training officers on how to better use their sites”).
58
See, e.g., Aswumb, supra note 21, at 23 (describing how attorneys researched jurors on social-networking sites
and then tailored their opening and closing arguments based on information found on jurors’ profiles, such as lines
from a juror’s favorite book); see also Jeff John Roberts, A New U.S. Law-Enforcement Tool: Facebook Searches,
REUTERS July 12, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/12/us‐facebook‐idUSTRE76
B49420110712 (reporting that the number of warrants authorized to search personal Facebook accounts for evidence
in litigation has increased twofold since 2010 and that warrants have been requested by several government
agencies, including the FBI).
59
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 20, at 1225 (discussing a situation in Utah in which the Attorney General “filed
sexual-exploitation charges against a twenty-seven-year-old man after law-enforcement authorities found on his
MySpace profile photos of the man and two boys with whom he was not supposed to be in contact”); cf. Rafael A.
Olmeda & Sofia Santana, Police: Texts from Dead Woman’s Phone Spurred Boyfriend to Lead Cops to Her
Mutilated Body, SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/broward/miramar/fl-miramarmurder-arrest-20100415,0,185168.story?4-16 (reporting that police caught a homicide suspect after using text
messages to track the suspect and trick him into leading police to the victim’s body). Police officers are also
susceptible to having their social-networking postings used against them. See Erica Goode, Police Lesson: Social
Network Tools Have Two Edges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/04/07/us/07police.html?_r=1 (reporting that, after a police officer who had listed his occupation as
“human waste disposal” on Facebook and was later involved in a fatal off-duty shooting, the city was forced to
adopt a new policy regarding law-enforcement officers’ use of social-networking sites).
60
Vince Tuss, 18-Year-Old Uses Facebook to Admit He Shot Companion, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 19, 2009,
http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/79692697.html.
61
See id.
62
See Marshall, supra note 2.
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home and noticed Parker’s Facebook page open on her laptop.63 Also, those accused
of criminal involvement at times have attempted to establish alibis using postings
made on social-networking sites. 64 Despite suspicion over their true authors, these
postings provide strong investigatory leads for law-enforcement officials,
exculpatory evidence for the wrongfully accused, and persuasive evidence on which
trial attorneys often rely.
Because social-networking evidence significantly influences how the judge
and jury view a witness or a party to the litigation,65 attorneys are learning to check
social-networking sites routinely for messages and photographs that could work
against their clients’ interests.66 As one lawyer stated:
There is nothing worse than at sentencing to be confronted with your
client’s MySpace page, complete with statements showing a lack of
remorse, inappropriate content or provocative pictures. Or, having a
client who feels compelled to use the Web to announce to the world
about the stash of drugs that the police didn’t find when they searched
his home.67
This information can bolster or destroy witnesses’ or parties’ credibility. In
particular, tagged photographs68 can easily cast a witness in an unflattering light; a
quick glance through users’ profiles could reveal photographs of them pole-dancing
at a social event69 or exhibiting their favorite tequila brand just days after a drunkdriving accident.70 Joshua Lipton, a twenty-year-old college student who seriously
injured a twenty-one-year-old woman while driving drunk, experienced the damage
63

See id.
See, e.g., Vanessa Juarez, Facebook Status Update Provides Alibi, CNNJUSTICE (Nov. 13, 2009, 10:25 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/12/facebook.alibi/index.html?iref=allsearch. One minute after Rodney
Bradford updated his Facebook status with an inside joke directed at his pregnant girlfriend, two men were mugged
at gunpoint across town. Id. When Bradford became a suspect, police placed him in a lineup and one of the victims
positively identified him. Id. Bradford’s Facebook status update was later used to persuade the district attorney not
to press charges. Id.
65
See Laurie Mason, Defense Attorneys Trolling the Net, Too, BUCKS CTY. COURIER TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008,
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1549445091.html (“A Halloween party photo of a suspect hoisting a bottle of
tequila while awaiting trial for a fatal drunk driving crash speaks volumes to a sentencing judge. And jurors are not
likely to find reasonable doubt when a defendant blogs about his large drug stash.”).
66
See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 20, at 176-80 (offering examples of social-networking evidence being used against
drunk driving defendants).
67
Mason, supra note 65.
68
See Help Center, supra note 25 (defining “tagging”).
69
Nate Anderson, Google + Facebook + Alcohol = Trouble, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2006, 5:37 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/01/6016.ars.
70
See, e.g., Face(book)ing the Music (July 19, 2008, 12:32 AM), http://www.alexbitterman.com/site/2008/07/338/
(posting an article in which an attorney stated that he was “blindsided” by photographs of his client at trial holding a
beer bottle, wearing a shirt representing a tequila brand, and a belt complete with plastic shot glasses on it).
64

12

that Facebook photographs can do to one’s credibility. 71 Two weeks after the
accident, Lipton attended a Halloween party dressed as a prisoner carrying a sign
that read “Jail Bird” and allowed fellow party-goers to take and post photographs of
him—clad in his offensive outfit—on Facebook.72 At trial, the prosecutor compiled a
PowerPoint presentation of these distasteful photographs accessible from Lipton’s
Facebook page. 73 The culmination of the prosecution’s presentation was a
photograph of Lipton in his “Jail Bird” costume, smiling with his tongue out and
“his arm draped around a young woman wearing a sorority t-shirt,” to which the
prosecutor added his own rhetorical caption: “Remorseful?”74 The judge was candid
about the influence that the photographs had on his sentencing decision, stating:
“Without question, the most disturbing and troubling photo is the one where the
defendant is dressed up in a prison inmate costume for a Halloween party shortly
after this horrific incident.”75 After describing the photographs as “sick, depraved,
and disgusting,”76 the judge added that the photographs gave new meaning to the
old adage that “one picture is worth a thousand words.”77 Lipton received a two-year
sentence in state prison.78
III.

AUTHENTICATION OF SOCIAL-NETWORKING EVIDENCE

As social-networking sites play an increasingly important role in
investigations and trial strategy, information from these sites becomes useful
evidence for litigants. 79 Social-networking evidence assists litigants in their
ultimate goal—to persuade the finder of fact that they have met their burdens of
proof. 80 As with any evidence, litigants must overcome a number of evidentiary
hurdles before a judge will admit social-networking postings into evidence. Lawyers
and judges must figure out ways to deal with these admissibility questions,
ensuring that the basic standards for reliability are met. The ease with which
social-networking evidence can be altered, forged, or posted by someone other than
71

Edward Fitzpatrick, Facebook Photo Plays Role in DUI Accident Sentencing, PROJO.COM (May 27, 2008, 6:55
PM), http://newsblog.projo.com/2008/05/facebook-photo.html.
72
Id.
73
Face(book)ing the Music, supra note 70 (explaining that one of the crash victims provided the prosecutor with
photos accessible from Lipton’s page).
74
Id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 71.
75
Fitzpatrick, supra note 71.
76
Id. (quoting the judge’s statement about the photograph: “For this defendant to think of mocking and joking about
his irresponsible, reckless and life-altering dangerous behavior—on Facebook, for others to see, dressed in a ‘Jail
Bird’ prison costume for a Halloween party a mere two weeks after this incident—is sick, depraved and
disgusting.”).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See generally infra Part II.
80
See generally infra Part II.
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the owner of the account should raise substantial admissibility concerns.81 Thus,
the authentication of social-networking evidence is the critical first step to ensuring
that the admitted evidence is trustworthy and, ultimately, that litigants receive a
fair and just trial.
Authentication requirements serve as “a threshold preliminary standard to
test the reliability of evidence.”82 To authenticate evidence properly, the proponent
must demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence “to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.” 83 For a textual posting, this
requires linking the words of the posting to the purported author.84 The Federal
Rules of Evidence, and most state rules of evidence, provide a non-exhaustive list of
ways in which a proponent may authenticate a piece of evidence.85 Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), a piece of evidence may be authenticated by establishing
its “distinctive characteristics.”86 According to the rule, distinctive characteristics
including appearance, content, substance, and internal patterns are considered in
conjunction with the particular circumstances.87
Traditional forms of electronic evidence, like e-mails, are frequently
authenticated using the distinctive-characteristics approach under Rule 901(b)(4).88
Social-networking evidence is different from other types of electronic evidence,
however, because its characteristics and content often reveal nothing useful about
the author.89 With postings coming from fake accounts, or even accounts created
81

See, e.g., People v. Fielding, No. C-062022, 2010 WL 2473344, at *4–5 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2010) (defendant
arguing that the court should consider potential tampering with social-networking evidence).
82
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 544 (D. Md. 2007).
83
FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
84
Byron L. Warnken, Social Networking Sites and Criminal Litigation, PROF. BYRON L. WARNKEN’S BLOG (Jan. 3,
2011), http://professorwarnken.com/2011/01/03/social-networking-sites-and-criminal-litigation (arguing that
authentication requires a showing that “the person to whom any words are attributable is actually that person and not
another person”).
85
FED. R. EVID. 901(b); see, e.g., Washington v. State, 961 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Md. 2008) (noting that the Maryland
rule for authentication is identical to the federal rule); State v. Troutman, 327 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tenn. Crim. App.
2008) (acknowledging that the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 901(a) is “virtually identical” to the Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(a)); see also Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544-49 (describing extensively the methods of authentication
outlined in Rule 901(b) and providing examples of their use in federal cases).
86
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
87
Id.
88
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that e-mails were properly
authenticated because they contained distinctive characteristics, such as the “@” symbol, as well as the names of the
senders and recipients of the e-mails in their signature blocks). The Safavian court also permitted authentication of
certain e-mails by comparison to other evidence. Id. at 40-41. Here, certain e-mails reflected the address
“MerrittDC@aol.com,” which alone was not sufficient to authenticate them. Id. The court, however, compared these
e-mails to others that contained the “defendant’s name and the name of his business, Janus-Merritt Strategies, LLC,”
in order to authenticate them. Id.
89
Some might argue that social-networking posts are similar to chat-room messages because they are often “created
by parties using anonymity-protecting ‘screen names’ on websites where the host cannot be assumed to know the
content.” Hon. Paul. W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. and New
Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357, 371 (2009). This
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under nicknames, it is difficult to link a specific person to a specific posting. Thus,
social-networking postings are comparable to postings on websites, where there is a
real risk that individuals “other than the sponsor of the website” created the
postings.90 Accordingly, the proponent of evidence from a website might be required
to demonstrate that the host was responsible for the content of the website because
the host either created or authorized the content.91
Unlike with the other types of electronic evidence, few courts have wrestled
specifically with authentication issues presented by evidence from socialnetworking sites. And, while courts that address the issue generally work within
the existing framework of Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), or its state
equivalent, the rulings vary widely. Rather than evaluate social-networking
evidence on its own, some courts compare it to other forms of electronic evidence
and find no substantive distinction. 92 Other courts seem to dismiss reliability
concerns and admit the postings.93 Still other courts find that, given the low bar for
admissibility under the authentication rule, any reliability concerns go only to the
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. 94 Much of the case law
concerning the application of the federal rules for authentication comes from state
courts that adopt the federal rules as their local law. 95 Part IV surveys these
judicial approaches and discusses their shortcomings.

superficial similarity, however, is negated by the fact that many social-networking postings are made to an account
owner’s profile on a public “wall,” which may be viewable by all friends of that account owner. Depending on the
account owner’s privacy settings, the wall may be viewable by all users of that social-networking site, which may be
thousands or even millions of people.
90
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 555.
91
See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that website postings depicting whitesupremacy groups taking credit for racist UPS mailings were properly excluded because the defendant failed to
authenticate them). The defendant in Jackson “needed to show that the web postings . . . actually were posted by the
groups, as opposed to being slipped onto the groups’ web sites by [the defendant] herself.” Id. Other courts have
also found that URL addresses and date stamps are insufficient to authenticate web content, but that testimony from
a witness with personal knowledge of the actual site could be sufficient. See Grimm, supra note 89, at 369
(surveying cases that have addressed the authentication of Internet websites).
92
See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 806 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (“We see no reason why social media
profiles may not be circumstantially authenticated in the same manner as other forms of electronic communication—
by their content and context.”), rev’d and remanded, No. 74, 2011 WL 1586683 (Md. Apr. 28, 2011).
93
See, e.g., People v. Goins, No. 289039, 2010 WL 199602, at *2 (Mich. App. Jan. 21, 2010) (finding that the
content of an entry written on the complainant’s MySpace page was properly authenticated by its descriptive content
and that the defendant’s concerns about the authorship of the posting were dismissed by the “unlikelihood” that the
complainant gave her password to a third party).
94
State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008); STEVEN GOODE & OLIN G. WELLBORN,
COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL EVIDENCE 552 (2010) (stating that questions related to the genuineness of the
evidence go to weight, not admissibility).
95
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO AUTHENTICATION OF
SOCIAL-NETWORKING EVIDENCE
Despite the demonstrated unreliability of information on social-networking
sites, the current judicial approaches to authentication of such evidence have failed
to require rigorous showings of authenticity.96 The practical effect of this failure is
that judges and juries have factored into their decisions potentially untrustworthy,
even fallacious, pieces of evidence. Courts’ lack of accurate and careful attention to
the authenticity—and consequently, to the authorship—of social-networking
postings can be categorized into four general, yet problematic, approaches. In the
first approach, the court effectively shirks its gate-keeping function, deflecting all
reliability concerns associated with social-networking evidence to the finder of fact.
Under the second approach, the court authenticates a social-networking posting by
relying solely on testimony of the recipient. The third approach requires testimony
about who, aside from the owner, can access the social-networking account in
question. With the fourth approach, the court focuses on establishing the author of
a specific posting.
A. Punting Reliability Concerns to the Fact-Finder
In the first approach to authentication of social-networking evidence, the
court fails to perform its essential gate-keeping function by ignoring the reliability
concerns unique to this type of evidence at the authentication stage and by
permitting all such concerns to go only to the weight of the evidence. In this
situation, the fact-finder is left to interpret the reliability of the social-networking
evidence without evidence of its authenticity. Leaving the fact-finder, often a jury,
to consider potentially untrustworthy evidence is precisely what the court’s role as
gatekeeper is designed to prevent.97
People v. Fielding provides a good example of this faulty approach. 98 In
Fielding, the California Court of Appeal found that MySpace messages were
properly authenticated by the trial court and that any questions about authorship
96

Judges may require rigorous showings of authenticity, and they should do so when it is possible that evidence
could be altered, fabricated, or unreliable. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 43 (2008)
(commenting on courts’ ability to require a “more robust” showing to authenticate electronic evidence and
comparing electronic evidence to other technologies in which courts have applied a more stringent standard of
authentication, such as with tape recordings); 5 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL § 901.02[2]-[3] (8th ed. 2002) (asserting that certain circumstances may justify a stronger showing to
authenticate evidence than the prima facie standard that is typically required).
97
See PAUL, supra note 96, at 43.
98
See generally People v. Fielding, No. C-062022, 2010 WL 2473344 (Cal. Ct. App. June 18, 2010).
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went only to weight, not admissibility.99 The defendant faced charges of unlawful
sexual intercourse with a minor, and the prosecution introduced printouts of
MySpace messages sent between the defendant and the victim to prove its case.100
The messages contained evidence of the alleged criminal conduct, including the
following statements from the defendant: “[O]k so you only say [you] love me cuz
you wanna fuck me?” and “I want to have sex.”101
The defendant appealed her conviction, claiming in part that the MySpace
messages had been improperly authenticated. 102
The defendant’s primary
arguments were: (1) that the alleged victim’s father printed the messages from the
victim’s account and could have changed them; and (2) that the alleged victim
testified that someone had previously hacked into his MySpace account, and,
therefore, the messages may have been altered.103 Despite these seemingly strong
arguments justifying, at a minimum, an inquiry into the authenticity of the
messages, the court found that the supposed alterations were “immaterial” and did
not preclude authentication.104 Instead, the court likened the messages to e-mails
and relied on the reply doctrine105 as well as the content of the messages to find in
favor of authentication.106 Any concerns that the “incriminating messages . . . were
in fact sent or posted by someone else went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.”107
The Fielding court completely ignored obvious authorship concerns; its
holding contravenes the court’s gate-keeping function in such a situation. The onus
is on the court to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial. This obligation
includes an assurance that the evidence that goes to a jury is reliable. 108 The
Fielding court did not live up to these responsibilities.
B. Relying on Recipient Testimony
The Tennessee Court of Appeals used a different approach to authenticating
social-networking postings and messages. It found that a message was properly
99

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
101
Id. (second alteration in original)
102
Id.
103
Id. at *3–4 (“On cross-examination, the victim testified that somebody once ‘hacked’ into his MySpace account
and changed the ‘mood status’ he had posted from ‘I’m ready to win’ to ‘I’m ready to be gay.’”).
104
Id. at *5.
105
“If a letter or telegram is sent to a person and a reply is received in due course purporting to come from that
person, this is sufficient evidence of genuineness.” Jazayeri v. Mao, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198, 214 (Ct. App. 2009).
106
Fielding, 2010 WL 2473344 at *4–5.
107
Id. at *5.
108
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court.”); see also GOODE ET AL., supra note 94; PAUL, supra note 96, at 43.
100
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authenticated when the recipient testified under oath that the posting accurately
reflected the communications she had with the defendant.109 In Dockery v. Dockery,
a woman had a “‘no contact’ order of protection” issued against her ex-husband after
multiple instances of alleged domestic violence.110 The ex-husband later attempted
to contact her by sending MySpace messages to her friend.111 In the lower court
proceeding, the recipient of the MySpace messages testified that she printed the
conversations “directly from her computer” and that the printouts accurately
reflected their conversation while “identif[ying] which party to the conversation was
making a particular statement.”112 The court found her testimony alone sufficient to
authenticate the messages as authored by the defendant; that finding was upheld
on appeal.113
By relying solely on the recipient’s testimony, the court failed to address the
obvious reliability concerns with the MySpace messages. The court did not address
the possibilities that the documents could have been altered, that the proponent
could have been lying, or that someone other than the defendant could have
authored the messages.
The court’s failure to make these basic inquiries
undermined the fairness of the ultimate outcome of the case because potentially
unreliable, inculpatory evidence was admitted against the defendant.114
C. Requiring Testimony About Potential Outside Access to an Account
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took a different approach from
the two discussed above. In Commonwealth v. Williams, the court held that the
printouts of postings received on a witness’s MySpace page had not been properly
authenticated in the defendant’s murder trial.116 One of the prosecution’s witnesses
claimed that the defendant’s brother had been urging her, via MySpace messages,
either “not to testify or to claim lack of memory.” 117 The account in question
contained a photo of the defendant’s brother, the name on the account matched his
username, and the messages contained content that only someone familiar with the

109

Dockery v. Dockery, No. E2009-01059-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3486662, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009).
Id. at *1–2.
111
Id. at *5.
112
Id. at *6.
113
Id.
114
See PAUL, supra note 96, at 50 (acknowledging the authenticity problems surrounding website printouts and
pushing lawyers to ask questions such as: “[W]hat do we know about the [web page] before it was printed?”, “Who
had access to it?”, and “Was it edited?”).
116
Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1172–73 (Mass. 2010).
117
Id. at 1172.
110
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pending criminal case would know. 118 Nonetheless, the court found that this
evidence was not enough to authenticate the postings.119
The Supreme Judicial Court wanted testimony regarding the security of the
MySpace account, the people who could access that MySpace page, and whether
passwords were needed for such access.120 The court likened the MySpace page to a
telephone call, stating that “a witness’s testimony that he or she has received an
incoming call from a person claiming to be ‘A,’ without more, is insufficient evidence
to admit the call as a conversation with ‘A.’”121 The court was convinced only that
the account belonged to the defendant’s brother and not that he actually authored
the messages.122
Until very recently, Williams was the only case that remotely recognized the
importance of requiring some proof of authorship before a social-networking posting
can be authenticated. To support claims that a specific person authored a posting,
the Williams decision requires at least some evidence about who had access to the
account from which the social-networking evidence at issue came.123 In particular,
the court noted that foundational testimony may be able to establish that someone
with access to a particular social-networking account sent a message or created a
posting, but the court found that such testimony cannot establish that a specific
person authored the message or posting.124 Recognizing the authorship questions
inherent in social-networking evidence, the court even criticized counsel for failing
to present expert testimony to prove that the defendant’s brother was the only
person with access to the MySpace account from which the messages were sent.125
Although the Massachusetts court went further than the California and Tennessee
courts regarding authentication of social-networking postings, its approach remains
insufficient to address the authorship concerns unique to this type of evidence.
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Id.
Id. at 1172–73.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1172 (“[I]t appears that the sender of the messages was using [the defendant’s brother’s] MySpace Web
‘page.’”).
123
Id. at 1173 (“There was insufficient evidence . . . there [was] no testimony . . . regarding how secure such a Web
page is, who can access a My[S]pace Web page, whether codes are needed for such access, etc.”).
124
Id. at 1172–73 (“[W]hile the foundational testimony established that the messages were sent by someone with
access to [the] MySpace Web page, it did not identify the person who actually sent the communication.”).
125
Id. at 1173.
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D. From Establishing the Account Owner to Establishing
the Author of a Specific Posting
In Griffin v. State, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals authenticated
MySpace postings by establishing the owner of the account on which the postings
had appeared. 126 After the first trial ended in a mistrial, the prosecution’s key
witness changed his story. 127 During the second trial of the case, he clearly
identified the defendant as the killer and testified that after he saw the victim and
the defendant enter a bathroom alone, he heard gunshots.128 The witness claimed
that he changed his testimony because he felt intimidated by the defendant’s
girlfriend, Jessica Barber, and had lied the previous time to protect himself.129 The
crucial piece of evidence to support his claim of intimidation was a printout of a
posting made on the MySpace page of “SISTASOULJAH” that stated, “JUST
REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!”130
The trial court wrestled with how to authenticate this type of pseudonymous
posting made on a social-networking website like MySpace.131 Its solution was to
focus not on the posting at issue, but rather on the owner of the account on which
the allegedly threatening posting appeared.132 The court looked to the distinctive
characteristics of the MySpace profile page to link the account to Barber.133 These
characteristics included: Barber’s photograph, birth date, hometown, and the
defendant’s nickname, “Boozy.”134 The investigator who accessed the profile page
and printed the postings testified that he recognized the profile as belonging to
Barber because of these details. 135 Relying on this testimony about the account
owner, the court admitted the posting in question as properly authenticated.136
126

Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev’d and remanded, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011).
Id. at 794–95.
128
See id. (“Gibbs testified that appellant was the only person, other than Guest, in the bathroom when the shots
were fired.”).
129
See id. at 795 (noting that Gibbs explained his inconsistent testimonies during the first and second trials by
pointing to threats he received from Jessica Barber before the first trial).
130
Id. at 795–96.
131
Id. at 796–97 (explaining how the testimony of Sergeant John Cook, the officer who printed out the MySpace
postings in question, was offered to confirm that the MySpace profile in question belonged to Barber).
132
Id. (“[T]he prosecutor asserted that the profile could be authenticated as belonging to Barber through the
testimony of Sergeant John Cook, the Maryland State police investigator who printed the document.”).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 796–97, 806.
135
Id. at 796, 806. Although Barber testified as a witness at trial and could have authenticated the posting or
admitted ownership of the “SISTASOULJAH” account, the prosecuting attorney did not ask her a single question
about this issue. Id. at 796, 806.
136
Id. at 797. The defendant was subsequently convicted of “second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a
handgun in the commission in a felony or crime of violence.” Id. at 794. His conviction was upheld by the Court of
Special Appeals. Id. at 811.
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On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that both
the Maryland Rules of Evidence and the Maryland Rules of Procedure failed to
address authentication of anonymous postings made on social-networking sites.137
The court relied on Maryland decisions as well as decisions from other jurisdictions
applying the equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) to decide the ultimate
issue: “[W]hether the State adequately established the author of the cyber message
in question.”138 In its analysis, the court also looked for guidance from rules for the
authentication of other forms of electronic evidence;139 it saw “no reason why social
media profiles may not be circumstantially authenticated in the same manner as
other forms of electronic communication.”140 Despite the court’s noted concerns with
pseudonymous postings, it authenticated the “SNITCHES GET STITCHES” posting
as authored by Barber because the content of the MySpace account showed that it
could reasonably belong to her.141 The court never specifically linked Barber to the
particular posting.142
Although the Griffin court acknowledged the questionable reliability of
social-networking evidence, it nevertheless erroneously concluded that
authentication of the account owner sufficed to authenticate the authorship of a
posting found on that account.143 Supporters of the Griffin approach argue that the
content on Barber’s profile combined with the references to the defendant should be
sufficient to advance the evidence beyond the initial authentication hurdle.144 Like
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, they fail to see the bigger picture.
Social-networking profiles and individual postings can be created by anyone at any
time. Any person familiar with Barber’s or the defendant’s situation could have
created a profile in her name, hacked into her account, or, at the very least, posted
137

Id. at 803.
Id. (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 806 (“[W]e regard decisions as to authentication of evidence from chat rooms, instant messages, text
messages, and other electronic communications from a user identified only by a screen name as instructive to the
extent that they address the matter of authentication of pseudonymous electronic messages based on content and
context.”). Most specifically, the court looked at its previous holding in Dickens v. State, where it authenticated
anonymous text messages as authored by the defendant under Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-901(b)(4) by looking at
the content and circumstance of the messages. Id. at 803–04. In its discussion of Dickens, the Griffin court
suggested that Dickens also stands for the proposition that “circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish
authorship of an electronic message” without further “technological data.” Id. at 804.
140
Id. at 806.
141
Id. at 806–07.
142
See id. at 806 (noting that the posting was never authenticated by Barber or by “expert information technology
evidence”); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 11–12, Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (No. 74), 2010 WL
5096820 at *10–11 (“The State failed to authenticate the statements on the MySpace page as statements made by
Barber and failed to authenticate the page itself as having been created by Barber.”) (footnote omitted).
143
Id. at 806.
144
See Brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 8, Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (No. 74), 2010 WL
5146302 at *8 (“Given the photograph, personal information, and repeated references to freeing ‘Boozy,’ it would
not be unreasonable for a finder of fact to believe that the MySpace page was in fact Barber’s.”).
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to her profile page.145 In upholding the trial court’s decision, therefore, the Griffin
court incorrectly found that the jury had an adequate basis from which to determine
that Barber was the author of the “SNITCHES GET STITCHES” posting that
appeared on her profile page.
On April 28, 2011, the Maryland Court of Appeals saw the bigger picture and
reversed the Court of Special Appeals, taking a major step toward an authorshipcentric approach to the admission of social-networking evidence.147 Judge Battaglia,
for the 5-2 majority, posed the general question in the case as follows: “[W]e are
tasked with determining the appropriate way to authenticate, for evidential
purposes, electronically stored information printed from a social networking
website, in particular, MySpace.”148 The court summarized the process of creating a
profile on MySpace, reviewed the possibilities for abuse, and held “that the pages
allegedly printed from Griffin’s girlfriend’s (Barber) MySpace profile were not
properly authenticated.”149 The court remanded the case for a new trial.150
The Maryland Court of Appeals was most concerned that “anyone can create
a fictitious account and masquerade under another person’s name or can gain
access to another’s account by obtaining the user’s username and password.”151 The
majority stated that the lower court “gave short shrift to [this hacking] concern,”152
agreeing with appellant Griffin:
[T]he trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the MySpace
evidence . . . because the picture of Ms. Barber, coupled with her birth
date and location, were not sufficient “distinctive characteristics” on a
MySpace profile to authenticate its printout, given the prospect that
someone other than Ms. Barber could have not only created the site,
but also posted the “snitches get stitches” comment.153
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See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 142, at 10–12.
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 428.
148
Id. at 416–17 (footnotes omitted). Judge Battaglia stated the more specific question this way: “Whether the
MySpace printout represents that which it purports to be, not only a MySpace profile created by Ms. Barber, but also
upon which she had posted, ‘FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW
WHO YOU ARE!!,’ is the issue before us.” Id. at 419–20.
149
Id. at 418, 420, 421–22.
150
Id. at 428.
151
Id. at 421. “The potential for fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social
networking site, thus poses significant challenges from the standpoint of authentication of printouts of the site, as in
the present case.” Id. at 422.
152
Id. at 423.
153
Id. at 423–24.
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In a significant move, the majority called for “a greater degree of
authentication.” 154 Unfortunately, however, the court did not indicate with any
specificity what that greater degree might require. Instead, the court noted three
possibilities that “[came] to mind”156: (1) “ask the purported creator if she indeed
created the profile and also if she added the posting in question”; (2) “search the
computer of the person who allegedly created the profile and posting and examine
the computer’s [I]nternet history and hard drive to determine whether that
computer was used to originate the social networking profile and posting in
question”; and (3) “obtain information directly from the social networking website
that links the establishment of the profile to the person who allegedly created it and
also links the posting sought to be introduced to the person who initiated it.”157
While the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that “[p]ossible avenues to explore
to properly authenticate a profile or posting printed from a social networking site,
will, in all probability, continue to develop as the efforts to evidentially utilize
information from the sites increases,”158 the court could have provided considerably
more direction for the trial court to follow on the remand.
V. AN AUTHORSHIP-CENTRIC APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION
The existing approaches to authentication of social-networking evidence are
inadequate, whether in kind or in degree. Courts generally have failed to compel
litigants to elicit clearly relevant testimony about the processes by which socialnetworking evidence was obtained and have routinely dismissed concerns about the
authorship of postings to social-networking websites. Specifically, they have failed
to require proponents of social-networking evidence to demonstrate a nexus
between the accounts on which the postings were found and their purported
authors. While the Williams decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court marked a step in the right direction and the Griffin decision from the
Maryland Court of Appeals went further than any other court to date toward
establishing an authorship-centric approach to authentication of social-networking
evidence, there is still a great deal of room for courts to develop better law and
practices in this ever-increasing area of concern in both civil and criminal litigation.
154

Id. at 424. The dissent argued that the evidence in the case was sufficient to authenticate the printout and that, in
any event, the issues concerning authentication went only to the weight of the evidence: “The technological heebie
jeebies discussed in the Majority Opinion go, in my opinion, . . . not to the admissibility of the print-outs . . . , but
rather to the weight to be given the evidence by the trier of fact.” Id. at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (footnote and
citations omitted).
156
Id. at 427.
157
Id. at 428.
158
Id. at 427.
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This Part emphasizes what the courts have largely ignored—specific,
adequate proof of who authored the posting in question. It draws upon the Federal
Rules of Evidence and several states’ approaches to authentication in the socialnetworking context and proposes authentication factors that focus on authorship of
the evidence at issue. The proposed method is no more onerous than current
authentication approaches and fits neatly within the circumstantial-evidence
approach to authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).159
A. The Need for an Authorship-Centric Approach
Addressing authorship is critical when authenticating evidence gathered
from social-networking sites. 160 Indeed, the reliability of evidence obtained from
these sites turns on whether the author of the posting is, in fact, the person
reflected in the evidence.161 Establishing the owner of a social-networking account
does not serve to establish the author of the posting at issue for the purpose of
authentication.162 In the social-networking context, then, proving “that the matter

159

FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). Courts have discretion to conduct a more stringent authentication inquiry without
exceeding the bounds of evidentiary rules. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 542–43 (D. Md.
2007) (“Although courts have recognized that authentication of ESI [electronically stored information] may require
greater scrutiny than that required for the authentication of ‘hard copy’ documents, they have been quick to reject
calls to abandon the existing rules of evidence when doing so.”) (footnote omitted).
160
See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543 (“[C]ourts increasingly are demanding that proponents of evidence obtained
from electronically stored information pay more attention to the foundational requirements than has been customary
for introducing evidence not produced from electronic sources.”). Also, the court in Lorraine provided this analysis
of chat-room messages, which can be analogized to postings on social-networking sites: “[T]he fact that chat room
messages are posted by third parties, often using ‘screen names[,]’ means that it cannot be assumed that the content
found in chat rooms was posted with the knowledge or authority of the website host.” Id. at 556.
161
See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 142, at 16–18 (discussing how the court in Commonwealth v. Williams found
that, even though the messages in question were established to have been posted by someone with access to
Williams’s MySpace profile, there was not sufficient evidence to identify the person who actually posted the
messages). Thus, petitioner argued that under the precedent set in Williams, the message in question in this case
must be authenticated as coming from Barber, which was not done. Id. at 16–17.
162
Id. at 17 (noting that a message sent from a particular person’s social-networking account does not mean that the
account owner actually authored that message). In a different context, a “producer of adult entertainment content”
sued 1017 defendants—“identified only by Internet Protocol (‘IP’) address”—for violation of the plaintiff’s
copyrights. VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No. 2:11-cv-02068-HAB-DGB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64656, at
*1 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2011) (denying a motion to certify for interlocutory review the court’s denial of a motion for
expedited discovery). The court stated: “The list of IP addresses attached to VPR’s complaint suggests, in at least
some instances, a . . . disconnect between IP subscriber and copyright infringer. . . . The infringer might be the
subscriber, someone in the subscriber’s household, a visitor with her laptop, a neighbor, or someone parked on the
street at any given moment.” Id. at *4. While it is premature to make sweeping generalizations about this case, as it
is still in the pretrial stages, one writer has called this ruling a potential “landmark” because the judge decided “that
an IP address is not adequate evidence to pin a crime on someone.” Matthew DeCarlo, U.S. Judge: An IP address is
not a person, TECHSPOT (May 5, 2011, 3:31 PM), http://www.techspot.com/news/43664-us-judge-an-ip-address-isnot-a-person.html.
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in question is what its proponent claims”163 translates into proving that “the person
to whom any words are attributable is actually that person and not another
person.”164
Consider the situation of a social-networking profile allegedly belonging to a
criminal defendant. Any person who knows the circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s case can easily create a profile or posting allegedly belonging to the
defendant that suggests the defendant’s guilt. This problem arises even if the
account actually belongs to the defendant. If the defendant’s account is accessible to
others—due to faulty password protection, carelessness by leaving the account
logged on at a public computer, or allowing others to access the account165—the
account is thus “authentic” in the sense that it belongs to the defendant. But given
the lack of account security, it would be unclear whether the defendant actually
authored any incriminating posting.166 This point cuts both ways: a falsified thirdparty profile or posting originating from the defendant’s account could also
exculpate the defendant. If the evidence is ruled admissible over a hearsay
objection, for example, the profile or postings would be authenticated if the
reviewing court focuses only on content; this could be crucial evidence if there is no
other corroboration in the case. This would also be the outcome if the court centers
its inquiry on account ownership, where someone other than the defendant
authored a posting from the defendant’s account. However, if the court properly
emphasizes authorship in its authentication analysis, these false profiles and
postings would be excluded before reaching the jury.167
B. Essential Factors for Courts to Consider When Authenticating
Social-Networking Evidence
Given the importance of keeping from the jury evidence that is likely falsified
or authored by someone else, what is the best approach for courts to follow when
163

FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
Warnken, supra note 84.
165
See OAuth FAQ, supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that users of some applications may unwittingly
grant access to post to or send messages from their account).
166
The court in Williams considered this very real possibility, ultimately ruling that the evidence gathered from
MySpace should have been excluded. Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Mass. 2010) (“An
additional reason for excluding these messages is that they could have been viewed by the jury as evidence . . . of
guilt. There was no basis for the jury to conclude that the statements were generated, adopted, or ratified by the
defendant or, indeed, that they had any connection to him. Thus, the messages are irrelevant to consciousness of
guilt and their admission was prejudicial to the defendant.”).
167
See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 142, at 14 (“[E]vidence of authorship is vital since anyone can create a
MySpace page and put any content on it that they choose, and people frequently gain unauthorized access to other
people’s profiles and make postings purporting to be from the profile’s creator.”).
164
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authenticating evidence from a social-networking site? The answer lies in the rules
themselves. When applying Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), or an equivalent
state rule, courts should adopt an authorship-centric approach that instructs courts
to ask the appropriate questions when considering evidence from social-networking
websites. This approach concentrates the courts’ attention on the unique issues
presented by this type of evidence, aligning the judicial process with the novel legal
issues presented by modern technology.
Refocusing the authentication inquiry on authorship will not require the
courts to engage in a more exhaustive inquiry than is already required for other
types of evidence. But the factors outlined below—which fit within the 901(b)(4)
circumstantial-evidence authentication framework—get to the heart of the proper
authentication questions in the social-networking context and build a solid
foundation upon which the court can decide whether to authenticate the evidence at
issue. The factors fall into three categories: account security, account ownership,
and the posting in question. Although no one factor in these categories is
dispositive, addressing each will help to ensure that admitted evidence possesses
more than a tenuous link to its purported author.
1. Account Security
This category focuses on the security of the social-networking account in
question, integrating the Massachusetts approach discussed above. 168 Because
security levels of social-networking websites and specific personal profile settings
vary, courts should evaluate the security of the particular account from which a
posting was made. The inquiry should include at least the following questions:



Does the social-networking site allow users to restrict access to their
profiles or certain portions of their profiles?169
Is the account that was used to post the proffered evidence passwordprotected?170

168

See discussion supra Part IV.C.
This factor is similar to—but less demanding than—the petitioner’s argument in Griffin that the court needs
foundational testimony regarding the operation of the social-networking site in question. See Petitioner’s Brief,
supra note 142, at 20 (“This lack of any evidence regarding MySpace privacy, security, operation, or use in general
or specifically with regard to the profile in question renders the posting worthless as evidence and demonstrates that
the State failed to meet its burden to prove that the exhibit was what the State claimed it was.”) (emphasis added).
The factors in this section by no means require the proponent to prove that the evidence is what it purports to be;
rather, the factors seek to obtain foundational testimony from different questions to allow the court to decide
whether to admit the evidence under the same authentication standard.
169
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Does anyone other than the account owner have access to the account?171
Has the account been hacked into in the past?
Is the account generally accessed from a personal or a public computer?
How was the account accessed at the time the posting was made?
2. Account Ownership

Questions that elicit information about the alleged account owner may be
helpful to the court at the authentication stage in various ways. Not only do these
questions assist the court in determining who owns the account in question, but
they also help to assess the likelihood that the posting at issue was actually
authored by the account owner. These questions integrate the approach taken by
the Maryland Court of Appeals in Griffin v. State.172 Unlike the Griffin approach,
however, these questions alone are not sufficient to authenticate a posting from a
particular account. A court should address, at a minimum, the following key
questions:




Who is the person attached to the account that was used to post the
proffered evidence?173
Is the e-mail address attached to the account one that is normally used by
the person?
Is the alleged author a frequent user of the social-networking site in
question?

Answering these questions should not tax the resources of the court. If account
ownership is in dispute or is unknown from testimony, the proponent of the posting
can subpoena the social-networking site to obtain the name and e-mail address used
to create the account, offer expert testimony from a qualified individual with
knowledge of the way the particular website functions, or seize the computer on
which the postings were allegedly made to examine the hard drive to determine
whether the postings actually originated from that computer.174
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The petitioner in Griffin argued that the “limited” testimony of the investigator used to authenticate the posting
and profile failed to meet the authentication bar, in large part because the investigator was not asked about the
security of the account—namely, whether the account requires a password to access the profile. Id. at 37–38.
171
See discussion supra note 47.
172
See discussion supra Part IV.D.
173
According to the petitioner in Griffin, this does not necessarily require expert testimony. Petitioner’s Brief, supra
note 142, at 35–36.
174
Id. at 35–36, 38.
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3. Posting in Question
The following questions seek foundational testimony about the particular
type of evidence obtained from a social-networking website. As the petitioner in
Griffin argued, “[s]ome evidence regarding the way in which material is placed on
the profile at issue is necessary since sites differ considerably with respect to how
information is posted, how it can be accessed and altered, and whether any privacy
settings protect the members’ content.”175 Here, the court should ask at least these
questions:




How was the evidence at issue placed on the social-networking site?
Did the posting at issue come from a public or a private area of the socialnetworking website?176
How was the evidence at issue obtained from the website?

The questions in these categories, weighed together, will allow the court to
make an authentication decision based on the authorship concerns inherent in
social-networking evidence. Courts that apply this authorship-centric approach will
fulfill their gate-keeping function and ensure that finders of fact will not have to
wrestle with the foundational reliability concerns that should normally be
addressed at the authentication stage.
C. Authorship Factors Are a Condition of Admissibility
and Should Not Go to Weight
For any document that is ultimately admitted into evidence, it is the factfinder’s role to determine the weight and credibility to assign to that evidence. Some
argue that the issues of authorship of social-networking evidence—the
“technological heebie jeebies” 177 —should be considered only at this stage of the
proceedings rather than in the authentication inquiry. This argument is misguided.
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Id. at 33–34.
The petitioner in Griffin argued for a distinction between postings or photographs on profiles and private
messages between specified individuals, noting that the “content of the profile at issue [in that case] . . . was not a
communication between specified individuals, but rather was posted on the Internet for anyone to see as evidenced
by the fact that [the lead investigator] was able to access it.” Id. at 21.
177
See Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 424, 430 (Md. 2011) (Harrell, J., dissenting); see also discussion supra note
154.
176
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Although the question of authentication is indeed “a narrow legal one,”178 this
threshold burden must still be met before a judge can allow the evidence to reach
the jury.179 Addressing these concerns using the factors presented above does not
require a higher burden for authentication.180 Weighing the factors merely requires
different foundational testimony to meet the same well-established authentication
bar—that a reasonable fact-finder could find the evidence to be what the proponent
claims.181
The court must address critical authorship concerns at the authentication
stage, because there are two significant possible consequences of a wrongly focused
authentication inquiry. First, if the court does not consider these issues during the
authentication stage, the court will be unable to give the fact-finder a proper
foundation upon which to evaluate the reliability and credibility of the evidence.
Weighing the authorship factors under Rule 901(b)(4) remedies this problem. If the
document is authenticated after weighing the foregoing factors, the court can direct
the finder of fact to focus on any authorship disputes or other issues that were
insufficient to bar the evidence from admissibility. These issues will then go to the
weight of the evidence.182
Second, if the document is admitted under one of the current approaches and
is so inherently unreliable that it would have been excluded under an authorshipcentric authentication process, the fact-finder will then consider evidence that may
seriously prejudice the party against whom the evidence is offered. The fact that the
authentication bar is a low one is of no consequence; the bar must still be met as a
matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Courts should not view the authentication of evidence obtained from socialnetworking websites in a one-size-fits-all framework,183 especially in light of the
178

Brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, supra note 144, at 4.
Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 142, at 12 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Evid. § 5-901(a) (West 2011)).
180
See Petitioner/Cross-Respondent’s Reply Brief at 2, Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (No. 74), 2010 WL
5146302 at *2 (“While the State claims that this standard would require ‘definitive proof of authorship,’ it does not
pose an onerous burden and may easily be met with circumstantial evidence.”).
181
Brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, supra note 144, at 5–6.
182
See Petitioner/Cross-Respondent’s Reply Brief, supra note 180, at 2 (“Because of the unique authentication
concerns implicated by the anonymous nature of the Internet, the proponent of evidence obtained from a social
networking website must provide some evidence that links the posting to the purported author separate and apart
from the posting itself.”); see also GOODE ET AL., supra note 94.
183
See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 553–54 (D. Md. 2007) (recognizing that “any serious
consideration of the requirement to authenticate electronic evidence needs to acknowledge that, given the wide
diversity of such evidence, there is no single approach to authentication that will work in all instances,” but arguing
that “[i]t is possible . . . to identify certain authentication issues that have been noted by courts and commentators
179
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flexible approach to authentication inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence and
its state counterparts. The issues of anonymity and authorship presented by socialnetworking websites differ from the authentication issues raised by more
traditional evidence. Authentication must be more finely tailored to resolve the
ultimate issues at stake in the social-networking context.
As courts grapple with the novel evidentiary questions presented by socialnetworking websites, new technologies are being developed and unique legal issues
are certain to accompany them. The authentication factors outlined in this Article,
however, constitute a good starting point. The authorship-centric approach properly
shifts a court’s attention from content and account ownership to authorship,
keeping pace with the most serious problems presented by technologies that make
communicating across the globe just as easy as concealing one’s identity on the
Internet. The goal of this approach is not to protect people from their own stupidity
in posting embarrassing or incriminating information online. Rather, it is to
underscore the importance of fairness and accuracy in the outcome of judicial
proceedings that involve social-networking evidence.

with particular types of electronic evidence and to be forearmed with this knowledge to develop authenticating facts
that address these concerns”).
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